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Abstract. FUND is an integrated assessment model of the interactions between climate and economy.
Nine world regions emit greenhouse gases, and suffer damages from climate change. A number
of greenhouse gas emission reduction policies are compared, including optimal and cost-effective
strategies, strategies with early and late abatement, and strategies with and without international
co-operation. The analyses confirm that co-operation matters, resulting in substantially lower costs
or higher welfare. The real commitments of policy targets based on an absolute level (e.g., 1990
emissions) are hard to estimate because of the uncertainties in the baseline. Postponing action con-
flicts with minimising costs and maximising welfare, but so does sharp emission reduction at the
short-term as proposed in the Kyoto Protocol.
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1. Introduction
Plans and advice for greenhouse gas emission reduction policy abound. The differ-
ence between well and not-so-well designed policies may be in costs of an order
of magnitude higher. That difference is important since the sum of money involved
are substantial, and stringent emission abatement is not universally accepted to
be necessary. Keeping economic costs as low as possible thus increases political
feasibility.
This paper looks at industrial carbon dioxide emission reduction strategies from
the perspective of the temporal and, to a lesser extent, spatial allocation of abate-
ment efforts. The experiments of the Energy Modeling Forum Round 14, Subgroup
on Distribution of Costs and Benefits are run with the FUND model. In addition,
a number of alternatives are analysed so as to spell out some of the consequences
of the assumptions underlying the work of EMF14. Emission reduction profiles,
net present costs, and their distribution over large regions are compared. There
has been substantial discussion about desirable time profiles of emission reduction
(cf. Azar and Rodhe 1997; Grubb 1997; Ramakrishna 1997; Wigley 1997; Wigley
et al. 1996), but model-based analyses are scarcer than this discussion suggests
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(Edmonds et al. 1997; Ha Duong et al. 1997; Manne and Richels 1996, 1997).
Geographic distributions have received more thorough attention in the literature
(see the surveys of Banuri et al. 1996; Fisher et al. 1996; Hourcade et al. 1996;
Weyant et al. 1996), and therefore attract less attention in this contribution.
Although the paper speaks about issues high on the international, environ-
mental policy agenda, results should be interpreted with greater than usual care.
The political agenda reaches out to about 2015, and is mostly about emissions.
The model used here reaches out to 2200, and is mostly about concentrations.
The Kyoto Protocol talks about carbon sinks and non-CO2 greenhouse gases. The
model can only analyse reductions of industrial carbon dioxide emissions, for want
of information of the costs of emission reduction for other gases, and for want of
information about the costs of enhancing carbon sinks.
Section 2 describes the model, Section 3 the scenarios. Section 4 discusses the
outcomes. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
The model used is version 1.6 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negoti-
ation and Distribution (FUND).1 Version 1.6 differs in a number of ways from
version 1.5, which is described in Tol (1996, 1997a). The main differences between
this and the previous versions are (i) the representations of atmosphere and climate,
(ii) the costs of emission reduction, particularly in non-OECD regions, and (iii)
the decision-making structure. Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous
scenarios and endogenous perturbations. The model is specified for nine major
world-regions: OECD-America (excl. Mexico); OECD-Europe; OECD-Pacific
(excl. South Korea); Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union;
Middle East; Latin America; South and Southeast Asia; Centrally Planned Asia;
and Africa. The model runs from 1950 to 2200, in time steps of a year. Some
overlap with the observational record provides an opportunity for model valida-
tion. The prime reason for starting in 1950, however, is the necessity to initialise
the climate change impact module. In FUND, climate impacts are assumed to
depend on the impact of the year before, to reflect the process of adjustment to
climate change. Thus, climate impacts are misrepresented in the first decades. This
would bias optimal control if the first decades of the simulation coincided with the
first decades of emission abatement. Similarly, the period 2100–2200 is there to
provide the forward-looking agents in the 21st century for the proper time horizon.
The calculated emission reductions in 2100–2200 have little meaning in and of
themselves.
The IMAGE database (Batjes and Goldewijk 1994) is the basis for the calibra-
tion of the model to the period 1950–1990. Scenarios for the period 2010–2100 are
based on the EMF Standardised Scenario. Note that the original EMF scenario had
to be adjusted to fit FUND’s nine regions and yearly time-step. The period 1990–
2010 is a linear interpolation between observations and the EMF scenario. The
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period 2100–2200 is an extrapolation of the EMF scenario. In addition, a library
of alternative scenarios is available, consisting of the EMF Standardised Scenario
(proper), and the IPCC IS92a, IS92d and IS92f scenarios (Leggett et al. 1992).
The scenarios concern the rate of population growth, urbanisation, economic
growth, autonomous energy efficiency improvements, the rate of decarbonisation
of the energy use (autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions of
carbon dioxide from land use change, methane and nitrous oxide.
The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact
of climate change. Population falls with climate change deaths, resulting from
changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and tropical cyclones. Heat and cold
stress are assumed to affect only the elderly, non-reproductive population, so
that the number of new births is not affected by heat and cold stress. The other
sources of mortality do affect the number of births. Heat stress only affects urban
population. The share of urban in total population is, up to 2025, based on the
World Resources Databases; after 2025, urban population slowly converges to
95% of total population (comparable to present day Belgium or Kuwait); this is
not varied between the scenarios. Population also changes with climate-induced
migration between the regions. Immigrants are assumed to assimilate immediately
and completely with the host population.
The tangible impacts of climate change are dead-weight losses to the economy.
Consumption and investment are reduced, without changing the saving’s rate.
Climate change thus reduces long-term economic growth, although at the short-
term consumption takes a deeper cut. Economic growth is also reduced by carbon
dioxide emission abatement.
The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy
supply autonomously decrease over time. This process can be speeded up by
abatement policies.
The endogenous parts of FUND consists of the atmospheric concentrations
of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the
impact of carbon dioxide emission reductions on economy and emissions, and the
impact of the damages of climate change on the economy and the population.
Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and then geometric-
ally depleted:
Ct D Ct−1 C Et − .Ct−1 − Cpre/ (1)
where C denotes concentration, E emissions, t year, and pre pre-industrial. Table I
displays the parameters for both gases.
The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide follows from a five-box
model:2
Boxi;t D iBoxi;t C 0:000471iEt (2a)
with
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Table I. Paramters of equation (1).
Gas a b Pre-industrial concentration
Methane (CH4) 0.3597 1/8.6 790 ppb
Nitrous oxide (N2O) 0.2079 1/120 285 ppb
a The parameter  translates emissions (in million metric tonnes of CH4 or N2O)
into concentrations (in parts per billion by volume).
b The parameter  determines how fast concentrations return to their pre-industrial
(and assumedly equilibrium) concentrations; 1/ is the atmospheric life-time (in
years) of the gases.
Source: After Schimel et al. (1996).
Ct D
5X
iD1
iBoxi;t (2b)
where i denotes the fraction of emission E (in million metric tonnes of carbon)
that is allocated to box i (0.13, 0.20, 0.32, 0.25 and 0.10, respectively) and  the
decay-rate of the boxes ( = exp(−1/lifetime), with life-times infinity, 363, 74,
17 and 2 years, respectively). Thus, 13% of total emissions remains forever in the
atmosphere, while 10% is – on average – removed in two years (after Hammitt
et al. 1992). Carbon dioxide concentrations are measured in parts per million by
volume.
Radiative forcing for carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide are based on
Shine et al. (1990). The global mean temperature T is governed by a geometric
build-up to its equilibrium (determined by radiative forcing RF), with a life-time of
50 years. In the base case, global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5 C
for a doubling carbon dioxide equivalents, so:
Tt D

1− 1
50

Tt−1 C 150
2:5
6:3ln.2/
RFt : (3)
Global mean sea level is also geometric, with its equilibrium determined by the
temperature and a life-time of 50 years. These life-times result from a calibration
to the best guess temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et
al. (1996). FUND also calculates hurricane activity, winter precipitation, and winter
storm activity because these feed into the damage module. However, these factors
depend linearly on the global mean temperature. In the current model version, this
is merely accounting; a future version of the model will improve on this. A future
version will also include other greenhouse gases, and investigate the influence of
sulphate aerosols (a regional climate effect).
The climate impact module is based on Tol (1996). A limited number of cate-
gories of the impact of climate change is considered: agriculture, sea level rise,
heat and cold stress, malaria, tropical and extratropical storm, river floods, and
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unmanaged ecosystems. The damage module has two units of measurement: people
and money.
People can die (heat stress, malaria, tropical cyclones), not die (cold stress), or
migrate. These effects, like all impacts, are monetised. The value of a statistical life
is set at $250,000 plus 175 times the per capita income. The value of emigration
is set at 3 times the per capita income, the value of immigration at 40% of the per
capita income in the host region.
Other impact categories are directly expressed in money, without an inter-
mediate layer of impacts measured in their ‘natural’ units.
Damage can be due to either the rate of change (benchmarked at 0.04 C/yr)
or the level of change (benchmark at 2.5 C). Benchmark estimates are displayed
in Table II. Damage in the rate of temperature change slowly fades at a speed
indicated in Table III. Damage is calculated through a second-order polynomial in
climatic change. Thus, damage Dt in year t is either
Dt D tWt C tW 2t (4a)
or
Dt D t1Wt C t1W 2t C Dt−1 (4b)
with W the appropriate climate variable (temperature, sea level, hurricane activity,
etc.) and ,  and  parameters.
Damage is distinguished between tangible (market) and intangible (non-market)
effects. Tangible damages affect investment and consumption; through investment,
economic growth is affected; through consumption, welfare is affected. Intangible
damages effect welfare.
Relative vulnerability to climate change –  and  in (4) – is a function of
economic development in many ways. The importance of agriculture falls with
economic growth. The share of agriculture in total output changes with per capita
income with an elasticity of 0.31, which corresponds to the per capita income
elasticity across FUND’s 9 regions in 1990. Malaria incidence and the inclina-
tion to migrate fall logistically with increases in per capita income. Heat stress
increases linearly with urbanisation. The valuation of intangible impacts increases
logistically with per capita income.
Emission abatement is restricted to industrial sources of carbon dioxide. The
costs of carbon dioxide emission reduction are calibrated to the survey results of
Hourcade et al. (1996), supplemented with results of Rose and Stevens (1993) for
developing countries. Regional and global average cost estimates, and their stand-
ard deviations result. Regional relative costs are shrunk to the global average, that
is, the weighted average of the regional and global average is taken, with the inverse
variances as weights. This reduces the influence of a single study. It particularly
influences the developing regions, for which much less information on emission
abatement costs is available. Costs are represented by a quadratic function. Table
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Table II. Monetized estimates of the impact of global warming (in 109 US$ per year).
Region Species Life Agric. Sea Extreme Total
Level (temperature: +2.5 C; sea level + 50 cm; hurricane activity: + 2.5%; winter
precipitation: + 10%; extratropical storm intensity: +10%)
OECD-A 0.0 −1.0 −5.3 0.9 2.5 −2.9
OECD-E 0.0 −1.0 −6.0 0.3 0.3 −6.5
OECD-P 0.0 −0.5 −6.1 1.5 5.5 0.3
CEE&fSU 0.0 3.7 −23.2 0.1 0.2 −19.1
ME 0.0 3.5 3.1 0.1 0.0 6.6
LA 0.0 67.0 7.3 0.2 0.0 74.5
S&SEA 0.0 81.4 15.8 0.2 0.6 98.8
CPA 0.0 58.4 −22.2 0.0 0.1 36.3
AFR 0.0 22.5 5.4 0.1 0.0 28.0
Rate (temperature: 0.04 C/year; other variables follow)
OECD-A 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.2
OECD-E 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7
OECD-P 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.0
CEE&fSU 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
ME 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
LA 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6
S&SEA 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6
CPA 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5
AFR 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
Source: Tol (1996).
Table III. Duration of damage memory per category.a
Category Years Category Years
Species loss 100 Immigration 5
Agriculture 10 Emigration 5
Coastal protection 50 Wetland (tangible) 10
Life loss 15 Wetland (intangible) 50
Tropical cyclones 5 Dryland 50
a Damage is assumed to decline geometrically at a rate of 1 − 1/life-time.
Source: Tol (1996).
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Table IV. Parameters of the CO2 emission reduction cost function.a
OECD-A 2.0789 CEE&fSU 2.0488 S&SEA 2.1268
OECD-E 2.3153 ME 2.1041 CPA 1.9544
OECD-P 2.2171 LA 2.1253 AFR 2.0931
a The proportional loss of GDP C in year t of proportional emission reduction R in
year t follows: Ct = R2t . The costs of GDP are modelled as a dead-weight loss to
the economy. Emission reduction is brought about by a permanent shift in energy-
and carbon-intensity.
Source: After Hourcade et al. (1996) and Rose and Stevens (1993).
IV presents the parameters. Roughly, a 1% cut in emissions costs 0.02% of GDP;
a 10% cut costs 2%.
In FUND, each region has its own decision maker. FUND 1.6 also distinguishes
generations of decision makers (rather than a single one as in previous versions
and other models). Each decision maker has control over a ten-year period only,
but does optimise the net present welfare of her region from the start of the control
period up to 2200. Each decision maker knows the emission reduction efforts of
all decision makers in all regions at all times. The equilibrium is found iteratively;
without co-operation between regions, convergence is rapid (i.e., 4 or 5 iterations);
with global co-operation, convergence is much slower (i.e., over 10 iterations). The
distinction between generations of decision makers has two implications. Firstly, in
a cost-benefit analysis, a decision-maker not only has to match her decisions with
those of other regions, but also with the decisions of other generations. Secondly,
the definition of intertemporal cost-effectiveness vanishes, as there is no decision-
maker controlling the entire time-period. Explicitly distinguishing generations of
decision makers recognises the sovereignty of each generation. In a cost-benefit
analysis, this implies that emission reductions are individually rational at all times.
Collective decision-making over generations and targeted capital transfers between
generations are impossible in the model as in reality. Cost-effectiveness also impli-
citly assumes that targeted integenerational capital transfers are possible (such
transfers are needed to make an actual Parteo improvement of a potential one).
In addition, cost-effectiveness analysis is usually biased towards the first period
(unless the pure rate of time preference is zero).
3. Experimental Design
A number of experimental runs with FUND 1.6 are compared here. These are
listed and described below. Results are discussed in the next section.
Business as usual: No emission reduction policy is implemented in any region at
any time.
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Non-co-operative optimum: Emission reduction is such that each region and
each generation optimises its net present welfare, with perfect knowledge of the
optimal actions of other regions and generations.
Co-operative optimum: Emission reduction is such that each generation opti-
mises its net present welfare (i.e., the sum of the regional welfares), with perfect
knowledge of the optimal actions of other generations.
EMF14: The next 12 experiments are interpretations of the modelling compar-
ison exercises of EMF14. Three stabilisation targets for the atmospheric concen-
tration of carbon dioxide are considered: 450 ppm, 550 ppm and 650 ppm. These
are translated to global emission constraints by EMF14 according to two time
profiles: WRE and WGI (cf. Wigley et al. 1996). The former emission profile
follows the business as usual scenario longer than does the second. Emission reduc-
tions can be implemented either as regional targets or as global targets (i.e., full
international cooperation; this resembles EMF14’s case with international trade in
emission permits, but without the economic ramifications of the associated inter-
national capital flows). The experiments are denoted by time profile, target and
co-operation; for example, WRE550NC denotes the WRE time profile towards 550
ppm, implemented without international co-operation. In the non-cooperative case,
for a stabilisation target of 550 ppm, developing regions do not implement emission
abatement policies before 2030. During the period 1990–2030, Annex I regions
(i.e., the OECD plus Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union)
each reduce their emissions with the same proportion so as to meet the global
emission constraint.3 After 2050, each region is allocated emissions proportional
to their 1990 population so as to meet the global target. Between 2030 and 2050,
emission entitlements shift linearly from the former to the latter scheme. The sum
of regional emission constraints lies slightly under the global emission constraint
according to EMF; for a number of regions, particularly South and Southeast Asia
and Africa, the regional constraint lies well above business as usual emissions. For
the 450 ppm stabilisation target, dates are shifted forwards by 10 years; for the
650 target, backwards by 10 years. In the co-operative case, developing regions do
not abate emissions before 2020 (450 ppm), 2030 (550 ppm) or 2040 (650 ppm);
regional emissions are set so as to maximise global welfare while meeting the
global constraint.
WRE550P: This scenario is the same as WRE550NC but that the current rather
than the 1990 population is used to allocate emissions amongst regions.
WRE550x: These scenarios are the same as WRE550NC but that the scenarios
for population, economy and technology are different. The basic scenario is
FUND’s. Alternative scenarios are IS92a (WRE550a), EMF Standardised (e),
IS92d (d) and IS92f (f). Note that IS92a, EMF Standardised and FUND’s basis
scenario are very close to one another.
WRE550CBA: This scenario is the same as WRE550NC but that regions also
reduce greenhouse gas emissions if that improves their welfare. Optimisation is
non-co-operative.
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CEA550NC: This scenario is based on WRE550NC. Emission reduction profiles
are different so as to lower the net present costs of abatement (for the world as well
as for the regions) while keeping concentrations below 550 ppm. This is not a
real-cost-effectiveness analysis, because global net present abatement costs do not
reflect the interest of the agents in the model and side payments across regions and
generations are not allowed. In addition, a full-fledged cost-minimisation algorithm
was not used. Note that either Wigley et al. (1996) nor Ha Duong et al. (1997)
minimise costs. Both analyses compare a fixed set of scenarios (the EMF scenarios
above). Manne and Richels (1996, 1997) do perform a real cost-effectiveness
analysis, with similar results as FUND (see below).
KYOTO: Two scenarios, based on CEA550NC, are added as a preliminary evalu-
ation of the agreements made at the 3rd Conference of the Parties to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change in December 1997 in Kyoto. In these
scenarios, OECD-America reduces its industrial CO2 emissions in 2010 to 93%
of its 1990 emissions; OECD-Europe reduces its emissions to 92%; and OECD-
Pacific reduces its emissions to 94%.4 The targets chosen are those of the USA,
the European Union, and Japan, respectively. The Kyoto Protocol has 2012 as its
target year. The Kyoto Protocol covers all sources and sinks of carbon dioxide, as
well as a range of other greenhouse gases. The current version of FUND cannot
analyse this. In the first KYOTO scenario, emission reduction is as above to 2010,
and then according to the principles of CEA550NC for 2010–2200. In the second
KYOTO scenario, emission reduction is as above to 2010, then frozen until it meets
CEA550NC, and then according to CEA550NC.
4. Results
Figure 1 displays six global emission trajectories for the period 1990–2100. The
business as usual scenario assumes increasing emissions. Welfare optimisation
does not alter this. Without international co-operation, optimal emissions are even
hard to distinguish from no-control emissions. The WGI550 stabilisation trajectory
implies an immediate deviation from business as usual, how drastically so depend
on the ambition of the stabilisation goals. The WRE550 stabilising trajectory
follows business as usual until 2020 (2010 for WRE450; 2030 for WRE650) and
then sharply bend away. The “cost-effective” trajectory (towards 550 ppm) implies
a smooth transition. The first “Kyoto” trajectory is also smooth, but significantly
deviates earlier. Table V displays CO2 emissions in 2010 as percentage deviation
from 1990 for the world and three major blocks of nations. The initial political
aims of the countries of the European Union (stabilisation at minus 15% by
2010 compared to 1990) roughly coincide with the WGI550 trajectory. The Kyoto
protocol speaks of −8%, which lies somewhere between WGI550 and WGI650.
Initial WRE emissions are too high from a welfare maximising point to view,
both with and without international co-operation (cf. Nordhaus 1994; Nordhaus
and Yang 1996; Schneider and Goulder 1997). The WRE550CBA scenario (not
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Figure 1. Global emissions of industrial carbon dioxide for the period 1990–2100 for the
business as usual and five alternative policy scenarios.
Table V. Emissions in 2010 as percentage deviation from 1990 levels.a
Scenario OECD CEE&fSU LDCs World
Business as usual C16.8 C28.2 C70.7 C33.9
‘Kyoto’ −0.8 C3.7 C69.6 C19.2
Non-co-operative optimum C15.8 C28.2 C69.0 C32.9
Co-operative optimum C1.2 C4.5 C53.0 C16.0
WRE450/550/650 C16.8 C28.2 C70.7 C33.9
WGI450 −27.8 C19.7 C70.7 C0.8
WGI550 −13.8 −4.1 C70.7 C11.3
WGI650 C3.8 C11.7 C70.7 C20.0
‘Cost-effective’ C12.7 C23.8 C69.6 C30.6
a Emissions of industrial CO2 in 1990 and 2010 according to FUND.
Source: Own calculations.
displayed) roughly follows the non-co-operative optimal trajectory until 2020 when
it starts roughly following WRE550NC. The “cost-effective” trajectory also implies
emissions lower than business as usual right from the start. This indicates that the
economically preferred option is to start slowly but right away with greenhouse gas
emission abatement. This would also allow time to decide whether a stabilisation or
an optimisation framework is appropriate, and to establish international co-opera-
tion. In any case, the marginal damage costs of emissions are likely to be greater
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Figure 2. Net present costs of emission reduction of three alternative stabilisation targets, two
alternative trajectories, and with and without international trade in emission permits.
than zero (cf. Pearce et al. 1996) and so is the current shadow price of a future
emission constraint (cf. Manne and Richels 1996, 1997).
Figure 2 depicts the costs of the WGI and WRE stabilisation trajectories,
expressed as the net present value (through 2050, using a 5% discount rate) of
the consumption losses due to emission abatement and the consumption gains due
to reduced climatic change. Obviously, the more ambitious the target, the higher
the costs. In contrast to earlier findings (Weyant 1997a, b), the difference in costs
between WGI and WRE is not that large. WGI is even slightly cheaper for the 450
ppm target.
The reasons have to do with structural differences between FUND and, say,
MERGE. In FUND, emission reductions lead to a permanent shift in technology,
away from energy- and carbon-intensive production and consumption. Early emis-
sion reductions make later emission constraints cheaper. The decision-makers do
not care about the costs of emission reduction their successors face (except of
course of its influence on their own marginal costs and benefits). An alternative
interpretation is that FUND’s agents are myopic (or have little faith in governments
enforcing long-term plans), so that rapid action always comes unexpected and
hence at a large cost. This conclusion is shared by Ha Duong et al. (1997), although
sharp emission reduction is of course also expensive in the near future (probably
even more so because of technological change) while being less effective (because
of the carbon cycle). The high costs of sharp emission reduction combined with
a baseline that differs from other models’ baselines,5 leads to emission reduction
efforts that are very different for different generations, for both WGI and WRE.
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Figure 3. Emission reduciton effort of OECD-Europe according to five alternative policy
scenarios.
Equity considerations apart, the non-linearity of costs in abatement implies that
the additional costs of one generation are higher than the cost savings of another.
Figure 3 shows the bumpy emissions reduction profile for OECD-Europe for the
WRE and WGI (non-cooperative) trajectories towards stabilisation at 550 ppm.
Marginal costs are roughly proportional to the abatement effort. Direct costs are
roughly quadratic in abatement. Figure 3 also shows the ‘cost-effective’ trajectory,
which is much smoother. Net present costs of this path are about 6 trillion dollars,
compared to about 15 trillion for the other two. The amount of 6 trillion dollars
is comparable though somewhat lower than the findings of MERGE, MiniCAM,
CETA, SGM and WorldScan (cf. Weyant, 1997a, b). Note that the models are
calibrated to the same sources.
Figure 3 also shows a ‘cost-effective’ strategy that complies to Kyoto (‘Kyoto’).
Emission reductions up to 2010 are substantially higher – in fact, close to
WGI550NC – in return for which emission reduction in the later years can be
somewhat lower. The next present costs for the whole world increase by about
1 trillion dollars to 7 trillion dollars. If the ‘bumpiness’ of scenarios is removed
(‘Kyoto2’), net present costs increase by another half a trillion dollars.
The results above are based on only one scenario, FUND’s base scenarios.
Figure 4 displays global emission reduction, relative to alternative baselines, for
the FUND, IS92a, IS92d, IS92f and EMF scenarios. Note that the EMF and FUND
scenarios are higher than IS92a, and EMF even higher than IS92f. The FUND
scenario is a bit peculiar, as emissions only start to deviate from baseline in 2020.
On the other hand, the FUND scenario is, for the period 1990–2010, better in
line with the observations over the period 1950–1990 than any other scenario. The
differences between the scenarios are profound. In 2000, the maximum difference
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Figure 4. Global emission reduction effort for five alternative baseline scenarios and one
policy scenario (WRE550nc).
is 4%, in 2010 8%, in 2020 18% and then increasing to 37% in 2090. Emission
reduction costs of policies based on an absolute baseline (1990 emissions) may
thus differ substantially with the reference scenario.
The WRE550P deviates from the EMF experiments in that current rather than
1990 population is used to allocate emissions. Obviously, the Annex I regions are
worse off than under WRE550NC as their share in the global population declines
over time. The same goes, however, for China and Latin America so that the gains
for the non-Annex region as a whole is insubstantial. The OECD gains sufficiently
to compensate the losing regions, that is, the Middle East, South and South-east
Asia and Africa (cf. Table VI). This indicates that the choice of 1990 populations
as the basis for emission allocation is not bad, considering the difficulties with
reliable and agreed population projections.
5. Conclusions
It is possible to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide at an accept-
able cost. However, comparing stabilisation scenarios, even the ‘cost-effective’
ones, with optimisation scenarios reveals stabilising atmospheric concentrations
is not justified on the basis of welfare-maximisation. Should policy makers never-
theless decide to pursue stabilisation, then the design of the emission reduction
strategy becomes very important. A strategy based on absolute numbers may prove
very costly. This follows from comparing the WRE ‘cost-effective’ solution with
FUND’s. The logic of WRE does not apply to FUND, so that a single target (keep
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Table VI. Net present costs of emission reduction for FUND’s 9 regions compared for
WRE550NC and WRE550P (billion US dollar; discount rate: 5%).
Region WRE550NC WRE550P Difference
OECD-America 4,834 6,669 1,835
OECD-Europe 2,514 4,515 2,001
OECD-Pacific 2,471 3,205 734
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 5,071 7,162 2,091
Middle East 223 102 −113
Latin America 93 105 12
South and South-east Asia −16 −63 −47
China 614 814 200
Africa −43 −78 −36
OECD 10,108 13,172 3,063
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 5,071 7,162 2,091
Less developed countries 871 887 16
World 15,762 22,438 6,676
Source: Own calculations.
concentrations below this level) is translated into a multitude of targets (keep emis-
sions in this region at that time below such level), dramatically increasing costs.
The same would happen if FUND’s solution would be transposed to another model,
or the real world. A similar phenomenon is observed when the baseline scenario
changes: emission reduction efforts and costs differ, also in a qualitative way, if
we end up on a different development path than anticipated. Therefore, given the
uncertainties about the future, agreeing to absolute target, e.g., emissions relative
to 1990 levels, may well lead to emission abatement stricter than agreed to, or more
lenient than intended. Since action is to be taken and progress to be reviewed by
sovereign states and their successive governments, agreements may crumble under
unrealised expectations. A better way forward, albeit harder to initially negotiate, is
a mechanism for adaptive control, in which targets and instruments are constantly
reviewed as new scientific results emerge and empirical findings accumulate (cf.
Rayner and Malone 1997).
A second feature that arise from the experiments reported here is that FUND
does not support the conclusion that it is better to postpone emission reduc-
tion a couple of decades. Indeed, welfare-maximisation advises early abatement,
although modest. Similarly, the ‘cost-effective’ solution of FUND starts controlling
emissions in the first decade, although again modestly so. This is in agreement with
the theoretical findings of Tol (1997a), using a differently structured model. FUND
does support, however, that drastic emission reduction at the short-term is a bad
idea. In fact, drastic emission reduction is bad at any time (for political reasons
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and because of costs). A smooth trajectory of abatement is much cheaper, and will
achieve similar concentrations.
Notes
1. The source code of the model is available upon request. The model is implemented in
TurboPascal 7.0 and operates under DOS and Windows.
2. Note that the boxes do not represent identifiable subsystems of the carbon cycle; instead, the
boxes are mathematical abstractions, as the model is a reduced-form version of a more complex
carbon cycle model.
3. This scenario was designed well before the emission target differentiation of the Kyoto Protocol
(which is small for the major players). In the cooperative cases, differentiation is allowed, based
on cost-minimisation.
4. Recall that FUND’s 1990 baseline slightly deviates from observations. The reductions are
relative to the EMF emission data for 1990.
5. Note that the global or regional emission allotments are not necessarily fully used. Since the
carbon cycle model also differs, atmospheric concentrations in FUND differ from their targets.
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